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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE K. THOl\IPSON and 
FRANK S. l\IARKHAl\1, co-part-
nership doing business under the 
firm name and style of THOMP-
SON-MARKHAl\1 COl\IP ANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL CO~IMISSION 
OF UTAH, WILLIAM l\L KNERR, No. 622 J 
Chairman and member of said The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, and 
0. F. McSHANE and FRANK A. 
JUGLER, members of said The In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, and 
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine 
Inspector, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In discussing this matter we shall refer to the plain-
tiffs as the Contractors, and to the defendants as the 
Commission. 
The Contractors have an agreement with the U. S. 
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Government to drive a tunnel through a mountain located 
about twenty miles south of Salt Lake City. When com-
pleted, this tunnel will be approximately three miles long, 
and will be used to convey irrigation waters from the 
Provo River to the Salt Lake valley. This controversy 
was brought on because of the fact that the Contractors 
insist on keeping their employees under ground more than 
eight hours. The Commission advised them that this was 
contrary to law, and threatened to take legal proceedings 
unless they desisted. The Contractors then made appli-
cation to this court, and secured a temporary Writ of 
Prohibition. The Commission filed a general Demurrer 
and also an Answer to the Petition, all of which are set 
out in the Contractors' Brief which has been filed with 
this Court. 
The law which the Commission claims the Contrac-
tors have violated is Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
and which, insofar as material here, reads as follows: 
''The period of employment of working men 
in all underground mines or workings shall be 
not more than eight hours per day, such eight 
hour period shall be computed from the time men 
go under ground until they return to the surface, 
except in cases of emergency where life or prop-
erty is in imminent danger; provided, however, 
when under ground hoists or pumps are in contin-
uous operation, hoistmen and pumpmen employed 
on such hoists or pumps may be permitted to be 
underground not to exceed eight hours and thirty 
minutes. Any employer who violates any of the 
provisions of this section is guilty of a misde-
meanor.'' 
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The law relating to this subject was first enacted by 
the Legislature of 1896, shortly after the adoption of our 
State Constitution. Section 6 of Article XYI of the Con-
stitution provides: 
''The Legislature shall pass laws to provide 
for the health and safety of employees in factories, 
smelters and mines.'' 
In their brief the Contractors contend that the eight 
hour law passed in 1896 was to carry out the mandate of 
the constitutional provision above quoted. Undoubtedly, 
this constitutional provision caused the initiation of the 
legislation, but the legislaion of 1896 apparently restrict-
ed and enlarged upon the constitutional mandate. For 
instance, the Constitution directed that the legislation 
should provide for the health and safety of employes in 
"mines." The legislation was restricted to "underground 
mines.'' The constitutional provision was enlarged upon 
by extending the legislation to underground mines or 
underground workings. 
In their brief the Contractors trace the history of this 
legislation back to its origin for the purpose of showing 
that it was the intention from the beginning that the law 
should apply only to mines and not to other underground 
workings. They refer to the titles of the various acts in 
the various compilations as'' A DAY'S WORK-MINES 
AND SMELTERS.'' A reference to these acts, however, 
will reveal that "mines and smelters" was not the title of 
the act, but was inserted in the law either by the engross-
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ing clerks or by the printer. The title of the act under 
consideration reads as follows: 
''AN ACT Al\iENDING SECTION 49-3-2, 
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, RE-
LATING TO THE PERIOD OF EMPLOY-
MENT OF WORKING MEN IN UNDER-
GROUND MINES OR WORKINGS, AND IN 
SMELTERS AND IN ALL OTHER INSTITU-
TIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OR REFINING 
OF ORES OR METALS, PROVIDING THAT 
THE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT FOR UN-
DERGROUND 1\iiNES OR WORKINGS SHALL 
BE EIGHT HOURS PER DAY." 
The principal question to be solved in this matter is 
what did the Legislature intend by the use of the words 
"or works." 
We all agree that the Legislature intended "or un-
derground works.'' The Contractors say that the inten-
tion was that the ''underground works'' was intended to 
mean the underground works in connection with an un-
derground mine. We say that the Legislature, by the use 
of the words ''or underground works,'' referred to sim-
ilar underground works other than those found in mines. 
If the Legislature intended that this act should apply to 
mines only, then there was no occasion for inserting in 
the act ''or underground works.'' If they had used the 
words ''The period of employment of working men in all 
underground mines shall be not more than eight hours 
per day,'' no one would contend that it did not apply to 
every man working under ground in every mine. The 
word ''mine'' includes every tunnel, shaft, raise, drift, 
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and eYery other portion of the n1ine. One is just as much 
a part of the mine as the other, so that the legislators 
had something in mind when they inserted the words "or 
underground works". They realized that in this moun-
tainous country many tunnels are being driven which 
do not have for their object the development of a mine. 
\Ye refer, for instance to railroad tunnels, water tunnels, 
transportation tunnels. They knew that the same methods 
were used in the driving of these tunnels as are used in 
the driving of tunnels in search of minerals, and they 
knew that they were driven by miners, and that one was 
just as injurious to the health of these miners as the 
other. The statute should, therefore, be construed as 
though it read: ''The period of employment of working 
men in all underground mines or other ground workings 
of a similar character shall be not more than eight hours 
per day." 
The Contractors refer to the cases of the State of 
Utah vs. Holden, 14 Utah 71, and State vs. Holden, 14 
Utah 96, and they claim that this court by these decisions 
has determined that the law under consideration refers 
only to mines. 
In one of these cases an employer was convicted of 
working his employee more than eight hours per day in a 
mine, and in the other more than eight hours per day in a 
smelter. The court had under consideration the sole ques-
tion as to whether or not the Legislature may limit the 
hours of employment in underground mines and smelters. 
In both cases it was definitely decided that the Legisla-
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ture had such right, and that the act was a valid exercise 
of legislative authority. There was no question as to 
whether or not the act applied to underground works 
other than mines, and this court, in either case, did not 
mention the subject. True, in the course of the long 
opinions, statements were made to the effect that the act 
applied to employees in mines. It is such statements as 
these that the Contractors have selected from these deci-
sions and cite them as holding that this court had already 
determined the issues involved in this action. 
These cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of 
the United States and upheld by that court in re: Holden 
vs. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. As stated above, all of these 
decisions hold that the Legislature may lawfully regulate 
the hours of labor, but they do not mention or even inti-
mate what their ruling would be on the questions involved 
in the instant case. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Utah and some of the 
other states have acts similar to the one under consider-
ation, I have been unable to find any case deciding the 
point raised in these proceedings. Numerous tunnels have 
been driven in the mountains for purposes other than 
mining, and yet the question is raised in this court for 
the first time. It is reasonable to suppose that the persons 
who made these tunnels felt that they were amenable to 
the eigh hour law and complied with the same, otherwise 
it would seem that the matter, long ago, would have been 
brought before the courts. 
We submit, therefore, that the Utah cases above cited, 
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are authority only to the effect that the Legislature may 
enact laws of this kind. The saine is true of the case of 
Short vs. :Jiining Co., 20 Utah 20, cited by the Contractors. 
The question under consideration in this matter was not 
before the court nor considered by the court. 
In their brief the Contractors next contend that this 
eight hour law is a penal statute, and being such it must 
be strictly construed. Then they cite cases from other 
courts which hold that penal statutes must be strictly 
construed. 
In answer to this contention, however, we refer the 
court to Section 103-1-2 of the penal code of our Revised 
Statutes, which reads as follows: 
"The rule of the common law that penal 
statutes are to be strictly construed has no applica-
tion to these revised statutes. The provisions of 
these revised statutes are to be construed accord-
ing to the fair import of their terms with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and to pro-
mote justice.'' 
This appears to be a complete answer to the theory 
advanced by the Contractors that penal statutes must be 
strictly construed. 
The Contractors next refer to the Missouri case of 
State vs. Cantwell, 78 S. W. 569. In this case the court 
was construing an eight hour law which definitely provid-
ed that it should relate only to tunnels, etc., being driven 
for the purpose of developing minerals. The defendant, 
as one of his defenses, claimed that it was an unlawful 
classification in that it protected miners in driving tun-
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nels for mineral purposes, but did not protect miners who 
drive tunnels for other purposes. 
To get around this objection the Supreme Court of 
Missouri said that railroad tunnels, water tunnels, etc., 
are only of temporary duration, while tunnels being driv-
en to encounter mineral are permanent in their nature, 
and hence there was no unlawful classification. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri and the Contractors 
overlook a vital point. They forget that all of these tun-
nels, mines, etc., are driven by men who make their live-
lihood by working beneath the surface of the earth; that 
when they complete one job, they go to another of the 
same or a similar kind. These tunnels are not constructed, 
for instance, by a group of farmers who go back to the 
farm when the work is completed. There is no reason why 
a miner in a water tunnel should not receive the same pro-
tection as a miner working in any other kind of tunnel. 
The Legislature of Missouri in the enactment of this 
act must have felt that it would be construed to include 
all classes of tunnels unless it prescribed that it should 
apply only to tunnels being driven for mineral purposes, 
and hence it made the classification above mentioned. 
The Missouri case, however, is definite authority to the 
effect that the Legislature may limit the hours of employ-
ment in underground mines. 
The Contractors also refer in their brief to a Califor-
nia case and a Wyoming case, but we cannot see that 
either of these cases has any bearing whatever on the ! 1 
question under consideration. 
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The Contractors next contend that if it should be de-
creed that the tunnel which they are driving comes within 
the purview of the eight hour law, then such law is uncon-
stitutional for the reason that the Legislature is without 
power to limit the hours of labor in such a tunnel. They 
cite the various sections of our State Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States relating to due process, 
the right to contract, etc., and they attempt to show there 
is no necessity for granting protection to miners engaged 
in the driving of such a tunnel, and they say that the Leg-
islature in the enactment of the law did not make a finding 
to the effect that such labor is injurious to health of such 
Inlners. 
This same objection has been raised in nearly every 
case where the subject has been under consideration. It 
has been repudiated by this court in the Holden case, 
supra, and in the recent case of McGrew, et al, vs. Indus-
trial Con1., 96 Utah 203. It has also been repudiated in a 
recent decision by the Supreme Court of the U. S. in re: 
West Coast Hotel Co., vs. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, wherein 
Chief Justice Hughes used the following words: 
''Times without number we have said that the 
legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity 
of such an enactment, that every possible presump-
tion is in favor of its validity, and that though the 
court may hold views inconsistent with the wis-
dom of the law, it may not be annulled unless 
palpably in excess of legislative power.'' 
And then again on page 399 of the Parrish case, the court 
says: 
''The adoption of similar requirements by 
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many States evidences a deepseated conviction 
both as to the presence of the evil and as to the 
means adapted to check it. Legislative response 
to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary 
or capricious, and that is all we have to decide. 
Even if the wisdom of teh policy be regarded as 
debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legis-
lature is entitled to its judgment." 
This court in the case of State vs. Packer, 297 Pac. 
1013, used the following language : 
''Where an act has a real and substantial re-
lation to the police power, then no matter how un-
reasonable nor how unwise the measure itself may 
be, it is not for the judicial tribunals to avoid or 
vacate it upon constitutional grounds, nor will the 
courts assume to determine whether the measures 
are wise, or the best that might have been adopted; 
or whether such laws are invalid on the ground of 
inexpediency, or whether they bear any real or 
substantial relation to the public welfare.'' 
And again this court in the case of Ashton-Jenkins Co. 
vs. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, used the following words: 
''Besides this, since when did the courts of 
this country become possessed of the power to de-
termine the necessity of a statute or want of ne-
cessity in any particular case, and make that the 
controlling factor in determining whether or not 
the statute was unconstitutional~ Such power does 
not belong to the courts. It is forbidden ground, 
upon which they dare not tread. The proposition 
is elementary." 
This Court in the recent case of McGrew vs. Indus-
trial Com., 96 Utah 203, 85 Pac. 2nd 608, had under con-
sideration the question of the right of the Legislature to 
10 
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fix a minin1um wage for women and miners. In upholding 
that right the court said: 
"That the State rnay impose limitations and 
regulations on the right to contract has never been 
questioned but the question as to how far the 
State may go has been raised often. Many laws 
restricting this right have been upheld. The one 
most commonly called to mind is the Usury Law 
which prohibits contracts by which a man may re-
ceive more than a specified rate of interest for the 
money he lends. ~Iany Sunday laws prohibit all 
contracts made on Sunday, one seventh of our nat-
ural life. Insurance rates and policy terms are 
regulated. Telephone charges, railroad rates, 
power, light, and gas rates are not only controlled 
and limited but prescribed and fixed by law.'' 
The Contractors lay great stress on the case of In re 
Morgan (Col.), 58 Pac. 1071, wherein the Colorado Su-
preme Court held a law unconstitutional which prescribed 
that eight hours should constitute a days labor in mines 
and smelters. This decision seems to stand alone. 
We call the court's attention to 16 R. C. L. at page 
487, wherein the author refers to the Colorado case above 
mentioned, and says : 
"In a number of states wherein mining is 
carried on extensively there are statutes prohibit-
ing the employment of workmen for more than 
eight hours per day in underground mines or work-
ings or smelters or in institutions for the reduction 
or refining of ores or metals, except in cases of 
emergency where life or property is in imminent 
danger. Apparently but a single court has de-
clared such a statute to be invalid, because the 
court entertained the extreme view that in a pri-
11 
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vate business attended with no injury to the public 
the legislature cannot prohibit an adult male from 
working more than eight hours per day on the 
ground that longer hours may or pr()bably will 
injure his own health. As might have been ex-
pected, the effect of this decision was promptly 
obviated by a constitutional amendment directing 
the legislature to provide for an eight hour day in 
mines or underground workings, blast furnaces, 
smelters and ore reduction works, or other branch-
es of industry or labor, that the legislature may 
consider injurious or dangerous to health, life or 
limb. Moreover, independently of express consti-
tutional authority, the validity of statutes contain-
ing identical or similar provisions has been upheld 
by the federal supreme court and by all the state 
courts which had occasion to pass thereon.'' 
The Contractors say that if the legislative act under 
consideration applies to the driving of a fifteen thousand 
foot tunnel, then it would apply to excavations for a house, 
a well, or a sewer trench. We are only concerned in this 
matter as to whether or not it applies to the tunnel in 
question, but we feel that it is no more applicable to the 
excavation for a house, or open sewer, or an ordinary well, 
any more than it would apply to an open-cut in a quarry, 
or the large open-cuts being made by the Utah Copper 
Company. 
It is fundamental law that legislative acts are 
construed in accordance with the intention of the legisla-
tors. The courts often supply words in order to express 
the legislative intent, or they may strike out words in 
order to arrive at the legislative intent. In the case of 
Dunn vs. Bryan, 77 Utah 604, this court quotes with ap-
proval the following: 
12 
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"It is a cardinal rule of construction that sig-
nificance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded 
to eYery section, dause, word or part of the act." 
• • The seYeral provisions of the statute should 
be construed together in the light of the general 
purpose and object of the act and so as to give ef-
fect to the n1ain intent and purpose of the legisla-
ture as therein expressed.'' 
"An interpretation which defeats any of the 
manifest purposes of the statute cannot be ac-
cepted.'' 
We call the courts' attention to the following words 
in 25 R. C. L. page 967 : 
''It often happens that the true intention of 
the lawmaking body, though obvious, is not ex-
pressed by the language employed in a statute 
when that language is given its literal meaning. In 
such cases, the carrying out of the legislative in-
tention, which, as we have seen, is the prime and 
sole object of all rules of construction, can only _be 
accomplished by departue from the literal inter-
pretation of the language employed.'' 
And again on page 966 the following language is used: 
"The application of the general rule that the 
intention of the legislature is to be determined 
from the language of the statute is not affected by 
the fact that the phraseology may be awkward, 
slovenly or inartifcial. Language which has a dis-
tinct meaning, however awkward and inept, must 
be held to express the legislative will, and the fa-
cility with which the legislature might have ex-
pressed itself more appropriately or more directly 
will not authorize a court to disregard the natural 
sense of the words actually used.'' 
As stated above, the Legislative did not need to use 
13 
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the words ''or underground works'' in order to reach 
every employee working under ground in every mine of 
the state. We must assume, therefore, that in the use of 
such words the law makers decided to go beyond what are 
ordinarily considered as mines. This court will take ju-
dicial notice that only a very small percent of the numer-
ous tunnels, shafts, etc., ever develop into a mine. They 
are referred to by mining men as ''prospects.'' 
The court will take judicial notice that we have in 
this State numerous long tunnels which were driven for 
the sole purpose of conveying water in order to drain the 
properties which are being worked for mining purposes. 
We call your attention in particular to the Ontario drain 
tunnel, the Snake Creek drain tunnel, the Tintic drain 
tunnel, and the long drain tunnel now being driven by the 
International Smelting Company near Tooele, and which 
is known as the Elton Tunnel. Some of these tunnels are 
more than three miles long, and never encountered a hat-
ful of ore. The Legislature knew of such tunnels, and 
knew that they were constructed by miners, and knew that 
the same methods were used in constructing them as are 
used in the construction of tunnels driven for the purpose 
of encountering commercial ores. Suppose, for instance, 
that in the driving of the instant tunnel, conditions seem-
ed to justify an ore depo~it about midway in the tunnel, 
and supposing that the owner of the ground decided to 
explore these conditions with the hopes of getting com-
mercial ore. He would undoubtedly drive another tunnel 
through the same formations that the instant tunnel is 
14 
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being driven. He would use the same methods for break-
ing the rock and bringing it to the surface. He would use 
miners experienced in underground mining. He may never 
encounter any ore or valuable mineral, and yet under 
the interpretation contended for by the Contractors, his 
men would be protected by the eight hour law, but the 
miners driving the water tunnel through the same forma-
tion under the same circumstances would receive no such 
protection. 
The purpose of this legislation was to protect those 
workmen of the State who toil beneath the earth where 
the sunlight never strikes, and where the air is damp and 
polluted with powder smoke and other gases. We cannot 
believe that the Legislature intended this act to apply 
only where the underground work was being pursued for 
the purpose of encountering commercial ore. 
The diseases which these underground miners most 
usually contact are miners consumption or silicosis. The 
court, we believe, will take judicial notice that these dis-
eases are brought on by breathing fine, sharp particles 
of dust which cut and injure the lungs. These sharp par-
ticles of rock are caused by the drills and picks striking 
the hard rocks. The powder smoke, the damp air, and 
the sharp dust particles are present in all tunnels where 
picks, drills, and dynamite are used. It makes no differ-
ence whether the tunnel is being driven for the purpose 
of finding ore, or for the purpose of conveying water. 
They are all driven alike, and the same conditions exist 
in all. 
15 
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These matters were known to the legislators, and it 
was for this reason that they used the words "or under-
ground works", so that they could protect underground 
miners throughout the State. Any other construction of 
the act is too narrow and will work to the injury of a large 
numbe-r of workmen underground whom the Legislature 
intended should receive protection. 
Most respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General, 
S. D. HUFFAKER, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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